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Accumulating evidence indicates integration of dopamine function with metabolic signals,
highlighting a potential role for dopamine in energy balance, frequently construed as
modulating reward in response to homeostatic state. Though its precise role remains
controversial, the reward perspective of dopamine has dominated investigation of
motivational disorders, including obesity. In the hypothesis outlined here, we suggest
instead that the primary role of dopamine in behavior is to modulate activity to adapt
behavioral energy expenditure to the prevailing environmental energy conditions, with
the role of dopamine in reward and motivated behaviors derived from its primary role
in energy balance. Dopamine has long been known to modulate activity, exemplified
by psychostimulants that act via dopamine. More recently, there has been nascent
investigation into the role of dopamine in modulating voluntary activity, with some
investigators suggesting that dopamine may serve as a final common pathway that
couples energy sensing to regulated voluntary energy expenditure. We suggest that
interposed between input from both the internal and external world, dopamine modulates
behavioral energy expenditure along two axes: a conserve-expend axis that regulates
generalized activity and an explore-exploit axes that regulates the degree to which reward
value biases the distribution of activity. In this view, increased dopamine does not promote
consumption of tasty food. Instead increased dopamine promotes energy expenditure
and exploration while decreased dopamine favors energy conservation and exploitation.
This hypothesis provides a mechanistic interpretation to an apparent paradox: the
well-established role of dopamine in food seeking and the findings that low dopaminergic
functions are associated with obesity. Our hypothesis provides an alternative perspective
on the role of dopamine in obesity and reinterprets the “reward deficiency hypothesis” as
a perceived energy deficit. We propose that dopamine, by facilitating energy expenditure,
should be protective against obesity. We suggest the apparent failure of this protective
mechanism in Western societies with high prevalence of obesity arises as a consequence
of sedentary lifestyles that thwart energy expenditure.
Keywords: reward, energy management, dopamine, basal ganglia, incentive-salience, cost sensitivity, effort,
explore-exploit
INTRODUCTION
The idea that the primary function of dopamine is to mediate
reward is pervasive. Although controversies abound over pre-
cisely how dopamine may contribute to reward—or even if it
does (Cannon and Palmiter, 2003; Wise, 2004; Berridge, 2007;
Goto et al., 2007; Robbins and Roberts, 2007; Salamone, 2007;
Schultz, 2007; Redgrave et al., 2008), reward as an organizing
metaphor for dopamine function is so ubiquitous as to often
be treated as fact, a trend especially pronounced within the
obesity and feeding literature where midbrain dopamine is effec-
tively equated with reward (e.g., Kenny, 2010; Volkow et al.,
2010; Avena and Bocarsly, 2011; Berthoud et al., 2011). However,
decades of research have indisputably documented a clear role for
dopamine in modulating activity, best illustrated by the psychos-
timulant properties of drugs that increase dopamine signaling.
Salamone and colleagues have long argued that the primary effect
of dopamine is to regulate effortful activity, allowing an animal
to overcome response costs associated with pursuing valuable
stimuli (Salamone, 2009, 2011). More recently, genetic studies
exploring potential genes that regulate voluntary activity have
pointed to dopamine related genes with some authors suggest-
ing that dopamine may represent a “final common pathway” in
controlling voluntary activity (Leamy et al., 2008; Kelly et al.,
2010; Knab and Lightfoot, 2010; Mathes et al., 2010; Garland
et al., 2011). Despite compelling and substantial data suggest-
ing that dopamine plays a key role in energy expenditure, this
view of dopamine is overshadowed by the reward perspective.
For example, in many papers discussing dopamine and obesity
(Geiger et al., 2009; Berridge et al., 2010; Kenny, 2010; Berthoud
et al., 2011), dopamine’s role in energy expenditure is not even
considered, despite the fact that energy expenditure represents
conceptually half of the energy balance equation.
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To date, no compelling framework has integrated these two
distinct domains of dopamine effects and putative function, the
widely recognized reward function and the less prominent but
equally demonstrable effects of dopamine on activity and energy
expenditure. Apparent dopaminergic effects on activity are often
framed as a consequence of reward processes. For example, the
role of dopamine in modulating voluntary wheel running in
rodents has been proposed to arise from dopaminergic modula-
tion of the reward and reinforcement associated with wheel run-
ning (Garland et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2012).
Here we develop a hypothesis in which the primary function of
dopamine is to regulate energy expenditure. Specifically, we argue
that dopamine serves as an interface between the internal and
external environments matching behavioral energy expenditure
to the prevailing, environmental energy economy. We propose
that dopamine regulates energy expenditure along two dimen-
sions: (1) how much energy to expend (conserve-expend axis)
and (2) how to distribute or allocate energy to different activ-
ities (an explore-exploit axis, elaborated below). In this view,
dopamine’s reward related effects arise secondary to and in the
service of adaptively managing energy expenditure. We are pro-
foundly indebted to Salamone’s elegant work and dogged focus
on the role of dopamine in regulating effort and his persistent
criticism of the reward hypothesis of dopamine. The present
hypothesis represents an integration and expansion of his fun-
damental insights into a broader hypothesis in which dopamine
adaptively regulates both effort and reward—scaling the impact
of prior reward history on current behavior—with respect to the
availability of energy in the environment.
INVESTIGATING DOPAMINE IN AN ADAPTIVE,
SEMI-NATURALISTIC CONTEXT
Below, we will first review recent studies from our laboratory
that draw into question the primacy of reward in the dopamin-
ergic modulation of behavior and highlight its role in energy
expenditure. Subsequently, we will elaborate an energy economics
hypothesis of dopamine function, reviewing relevant literature.
Wewill concludewith a consideration of the present hypothesis in
investigating the role of dopamine in obesity. The term “reward”
is unfortunately abused within the literature, as has been pointed
out by others (Cannon, 2004; Salamone et al., 2005; Salamone,
2006; Yin et al., 2008). In particular, the word is used impre-
cisely and ambiguously to capture different concepts, including
affective responses (such as liking something), reinforcement (an
outcome that increases the likelihood of the preceding behavior
being repeated), stimuli that meet an appetitive need (e.g., food)
and so on. In the first part of this review, we (mis-) use the term
broadly, much like it is misused in the literature, as an umbrella
term to lump together and capture themes that pervade the lit-
erature, despite various theoretical differences between different
ideas. Subsequently, we will define reward more precisely as we
develop our hypothesis.
ELEVATED DOPAMINE: DECREASED COUPLING TO REWARD
Implicit in reward perspectives of dopamine is the idea that
dopamine enhances the impact of reward on behavior. Empirically,
this is supported by innumerable studies that show that increasing
dopamine increases the effort an animal exerts toward reward
while decreasing dopamine diminishes effort (Wise et al., 1978;
Taylor and Robbins, 1986; Aberman et al., 1998; Peciña et al.,
2003; Kelley, 2004; Cagniard et al., 2006a,b; Phillips et al., 2007;
Salamone, 2009, 2011). These cumulative data have led many
investigators to conclude that either the reward itself or incentive
associated with reward related stimuli are enhanced by dopamine.
Alternatively, the sensitivity to costs associated with obtaining the
reward may be diminished by increased dopamine (Phillips et al.,
2007; Salamone, 2011). What is often inferred from these stud-
ies, even if their authors adamantly oppose such interpretations
(e.g., Salamone), is that dopamine modulates the relationship
between reward and behavior in such a way that dopamine
increases the degree to which reward biases behavioral choice.
For example, Salamone argues that dopamine does not modu-
late reward at all; he shows that dopamine facilitates effort. Thus,
the animals’ pursuit of reward is less impeded by response cost.
Many have interpreted this as increasing the impact of reward
on behavioral choice not by changing reward itself but by alter-
ing a factor—response cost—that normally constrains reward
pursuit.
To examine how increased dopamine alters adaptation to
a semi-naturalistic environment, we asked whether or not the
repeatedly observed increase in motivation for reward would
result in diminished behavioral flexibility (Beeler et al., 2010). To
test this, we used a home cage paradigm where the mice lived in
operant equipped home cages and all of their food was obtained
through lever pressing, 24/7. No food restriction was employed
and mice were allowed to entirely self-regulate their consump-
tion. Two levers yielded food where one was always “cheap”
and required a low number of presses for a pellet (FR20) while
the other was always “expensive” and required a greater num-
ber of presses that incremented as the experiment progressed
(FR40–FR200). Which lever was which, however, switched ran-
domly every 20–40min. Thus, to obtain the greatest return for
effort expended, the mice had to monitor on-going reward feed-
back and periodically switch levers to obtain the lowest cost
pellets. We tested wild-type C57BL/6 (control) and dopamine
transporter knock-down (DATkd) mice that have elevated extra-
cellular dopamine and increased tonic dopamine firing activity
(Zhuang et al., 2001; Cagniard et al., 2006b).
We found that the mice with elevated dopamine (DATkd)
pressed significantly more on the high cost lever than wild-
type mice, consistent with prior literature that shows dopamine
enhances effort toward reward. However, in this instance the
increased effort did not increase reward, merely the amount
of effort expended toward that reward. Detailed analysis of the
data show that the DATkd were not insensitive to or unaware
of switches between the levers as their peri-switch behavior was
essentially identical. The difference arose during the stable peri-
ods between lever switches where the DATkd mice distributed
their effort equally to both levers while the wild-type mice
preferentially pressed the cheap lever. To better understand the
strategy underlying the DATkd behavior, we fit the data to a
temporal difference learning (TD) model (Sutton and Barto,
1998). In these models, there are two key parameters: a learning
rate that controls the rate at which new reward information is
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incorporated into (and fades from) the value of pressing the
lever and an “inverse temperature” that controls the degree to
which that value biases behavioral choice. The latter parame-
ter is often termed the explore-exploit parameter as a greater
bias result in exploitation of learning while reduced bias permits
greater exploration (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Daw et al., 2006).
We found that there were no differences between the genotypes
with respect to learning rate, consistent with the lack of learn-
ing differences observed around switches, but that the DATkd
exhibited a reduced inverse temperature. That is, there was a
reduced coupling between reward history and their behavioral
choices. At first glance this appears paradoxical. Although the
DATkd mice worked harder to obtain reward, consistent with
decades of literature, this does not seem to arise as a conse-
quence of reward exerting a greater control over their behavior.
On the contrary, there was diminished coupling between reward
and behavioral choice. Rather than reward having a greater bias-
ing effect on their behavior, it had less. Increased dopamine, under
these conditions, resulted in decreased rather than increased
exploitation. Interestingly, Salamone et al. (Salamone et al.,
2001) have demonstrated that rats with nucleus accumbens
dopamine depletions are more dependent on recent reward to
overcome response cost, suggesting the converse under reduced
dopamine, an increased coupling between reward history and
choice.
ELEVATED DOPAMINE: MODULATION OF EFFORT WITHOUT
INCREASED CONSUMPTION
Another idea implicit in the reward perspective of dopamine
is that dopamine, by increasing the degree to which reward
biases behavior, regulates the degree to which an animal will
pursue reward; that is, that dopamine mediates “wanting”: more
dopamine, more wanting, more pursuit (Robinson and Berridge,
1993; Leyton et al., 2002; Volkow et al., 2002; Tindell et al., 2005;
Berridge et al., 2010). This effect of dopamine is central to many
theories of addiction (Robinson and Berridge, 2001; Koob and
Volkow, 2010) and, more recently, theories of dopamine and
obesity (Volkow and Wise, 2005; Finlayson et al., 2007; Zheng
et al., 2009; Berridge et al., 2010; Volkow et al., 2010; Avena
and Bocarsly, 2011; Berthoud et al., 2011). In another recent
homecage study (Beeler et al., 2012a), we asked whether or not
under different environmental conditions this increased “want-
ing” could be adaptive. To test this, we again housed mice in
home cages equipped with operant levers where they earned all
their food through lever pressing, again without explicit food
restriction. In this paradigm, only one lever yielded food and the
work demand for that lever incremented every 3 days through-
out the experiments, starting at FR5 and ending at FR250. This
yields a demand curve that shows the degree to which mice
adjust their daily consumption to the current cost of pellets.
Assuming that dopamine increases the value of reward and/or
decreases sensitivity to cost, we would expect that the DATkd
mice with elevated dopamine would fare better in this paradigm
and continue pressing more at higher costs than wild-type mice.
Although the DATkd did showmildly increased pressing at higher
costs, overall they exhibited the same adjustment to escalating
costs as wild-type mice, with no difference observed in body
weight changes or survival within the experiment. Moreover,
when the data were fit to a model of demand elasticity (Hursh
and Silberberg, 2008), there was no difference between the geno-
types in elasticity. So where did the dopamine effect on effort and
reward go?
Analysis of individual meal data (i.e., number, duration, and
size of meals) indicates a large genotype effect where the DATkd
mice ate larger but fewer meals. That is, although dopamine did
not significantly change their overall consumption, it did change
their meal patterning—the way in which they temporally dis-
tributed their effort and consumption. These data suggest that
escalating costs induced a condition of scarcity that engaged
homeostatic conservation mechanisms in both the wild-type and
DATkd. To avoid this artificial condition of scarcity, we conducted
a home cage progressive ratio study where the escalating costs
occur within each meal or bout of pressing as the cost of each sub-
sequent pellet increases by 2. After a 30min cessation of all press-
ing, the ratio reset. In this way, mice could shift their effort toward
larger, more costly meals, or smaller, cheaper, and more frequent
meals without sacrificing overall consumption. In this study, we
observed no significant body weight changes between groups and
no significant difference in overall consumption. However, the
DATkdmice, again, ate larger meals and exhibited a higher break-
point within individual bouts, consistent with previous literature
showing that elevated dopamine increases breakpoint in the pro-
gressive ratio paradigm. However, as above, this greater effort was
offset by less frequent meals such that overall consumption was
not different. From these studies, we draw two important conclu-
sions. First, the effects of dopamine on pursuit of food, at least
in this paradigm, appear to remain under homeostatic control.
Second, dopamine does not appear to alter “wanting” or over-
all pursuit of food in a global sense but appears to modulate
effort expended within temporally local episodes of goal pursuit.
In short, dopamine appears to have affected the way energy and
effort is distributed rather than increasing appetitive motivation
per se.
We observe here that increased dopamine does not make
demand more inelastic; that is, overall hyperdopaminergic mice
adapt their consumption to response costs similarly to wild-type.
On the surface this appears contradictory to many studies that
suggest that stimulating or impeding dopamine transmission can
enhance or diminish effort-based responding, respectively (e.g.,
Aberman and Salamone, 1999; Bardgett et al., 2009; Salamone
et al., 2009b), presumably influencing elasticity in response to
costs. However, we observe the same phenomenon observed in
those studies: dopamine facilitates greater effort during a bout of
food pursuit, evidenced here by larger meals and higher break-
points. However, we also observe what session based studies
cannot—that these differences in effort, from which we might
infer changes in elasticity, are not necessarily accompanied by
changes in overall consumption and demand. Those larger meals
are compensated by fewer meals, resulting in an overall similar
elasticity in response to escalating costs. That elevated dopamine
did not produce inelasticity in these studies does not mean that
dopamine never modulates elasticity, only that the relationship
between dopamine, effort and demand may be more complex
than previously appreciated.
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ELEVATED DOPAMINE: DOES NOT ENHANCE HEDONIC VALUE
OR SHIFT BEHAVIORAL CHOICE
Another idea implicit in the dopamine and reward hypothesis
is that dopamine increases pursuit of preferred foods (Salamone
et al., 1991; Cousins et al., 1993; Salamone, 1994; Lowe and
Levine, 2005; Zheng et al., 2009; Berridge et al., 2010; Kenny,
2010; Volkow et al., 2010), where “preferred” is typically defined
as palatable, hedonically rewarding foods: things that taste good.
From an incentive-salience perspective, dopamine enhances the
greater incentive associated with preferred foods. Arguing against
this, Salamone et al. (Salamone et al., 1991; Salamone, 1994)
have demonstrated that under free-feeding conditions, prefer-
ence is not altered by changes in dopamine function; that is,
dopamine does not increase incentive or alter food preference
when no (or low) work requirement is present. In his stud-
ies, however, when obtaining a preferred food is associated with
a response cost, dopamine increases the effort an animal will
exert, thus altering the animal’s behavioral choice in favor of
greater pursuit of a preferred food (Salamone, 1994; Salamone
et al., 1994), which is often taken to suggest that increased
dopamine would increase pursuit of preferred food in a natural-
istic foraging environment by reducing sensitivity to associated
costs.
In a recent series of studies (Beeler et al., 2012b), we exam-
ined the relative contribution of nutritional and hedonic, or taste,
value to consumption, preference, and reinforcement and asked
how elevated dopamine may alter these. To test for taste value
alone, we used calorie-free sweeteners (both sucralose and saccha-
rin). To test for nutritional value alone, we used trpm5 knock-out
mice that lack the sweet taste receptor and do not taste sweet
(Damak et al., 2006; de Araujo et al., 2008), allowing us to assess
the impact of nutrition alone. In both cases, we used mice with
and without a knock-down in the dopamine transporter to test
the effects of elevated dopamine. The literature suggests that more
hedonically rewarding foods would be more affected by increased
dopamine. From this, we might predict that elevated dopamine
would preferentially affect hedonic over nutritional reward. We
found, first, that although both hedonic and nutritional value
induced increased consumption and preference, hedonic value
dissociated from nutritional value was a poor reinforcer. That
is, mice would consume calorie-free sweet solutions and prefer
it to water, but sweet taste in the absence of caloric value lacked
the capacity to induce conditioning in the two bottle condition-
ing test. Moreover, in a progressive ratio test, sucrose induced
increased responding across sessions. Calorie-free sweeteners, in
contrast, induced much less responding that actually declined
across sessions, resembling so-called “extinction mimicry” (Wise
et al., 1978). Berridge and Robinson (Robinson and Berridge,
1993) have famously described a dissociation between “wanting”
and “liking” in addiction where addicts develop “wanting” for
drugs without “liking”; that is, the incentive driving compul-
sive drug seeking is independent of its hedonic consequences.
These data suggest a complementary dissociation of “liking”
without “wanting” where one can experience a positive hedo-
nic response without developing associative incentives that drive
compulsive seeking of that experience in the future (Beeler et al.,
2012b).
Contrary to expectation, elevated dopamine did not signifi-
cantly change motivation for hedonic, sweet taste alone but did
increase effort for combined taste/nutrition as well as nutrition
alone. Previous studies of dopamine release have shown that
dopamine is released in response to taste alone (e.g., using intra-
oral cannulation to stimulate taste without postingestive effects)
(Mark et al., 1991; Hajnal et al., 2004; Norgren et al., 2006; de
Araujo et al., 2008; Wheeler et al., 2011). So why did we observe
reduced reinforcement to sweet taste in the absence of nutri-
tion? We conducted a voltammetry study in which the rats were
pre-exposed to both sucrose and saccharin pellets, each with an
identifying flavor, to provide them the opportunity to discrimi-
nate and learn about the relative nutritional value of each (Beeler
et al., 2012b). We then measured evoked dopamine release in
response to either sucrose or saccharin. The rats retrieved and
consumed both types of pellets equally; however, when we mea-
sured evoked dopamine release, the response to saccharin was
greatly attenuated compared to sucrose. In a follow-up study, the
same attenuation of evoked dopamine was observed in response
to cues predicting either sucrose or saccharin (McCutcheon et al.,
2012). The attenuated dopamine response to calorie-free taste
alone is consistent with the reduced responding and apparent
extinction mimicry observed in the behavioral studies with the
mice. In short, these studies show that increased dopamine,
though it increases effort and alters the distribution of energy
expenditure (i.e., meal patterns), did not alter consumption or
preference and did not augment “wanting” of hedonically valued
foods in the absence of nutrition.
In the conventional concurrent choice task (Salamone, 1994)
an animal has a choice between lever-pressing for a preferred
food or eating freely available standard chow during one hour
sessions. Salamone and colleagues have shown that dopamine
increases the ratio of preferred food to standard chow con-
sumed; that is, dopamine shifts behavioral choices to favor the
more costly but preferred option. Many infer from this work
that dopamine will increase pursuit of preferred foods. We tested
this inference by conducting a homecage progressive ratio con-
current choice experiments where mice could lever press for a
preferred food (PR2), either calorie-free sweeteners or sucrose,
or eat freely available chow. In this semi-naturalistic paradigm,
increased dopamine, as reported in the demand and homecage
progressive ratio studies above, shifted the distribution of effort
toward greater energy expenditure (i.e., longer bouts of press-
ing, greater breakpoint, but fewer overall bouts). Despite greater
effort, however, elevated dopamine did not alter their behav-
ioral choice as reflected in the ratio of preferred food to standard
chow. Salamone has argued that enhanced effort toward a pre-
ferred food observed in the concurrent choice paradigm reflects
alterations in sensitivity to response cost and not altered pref-
erence (Salamone et al., 2007). These data confirm and extend
this argument by falsifying the inference that the increased
effort observed in the concurrent choice paradigm will increase
reward pursuit. In a semi-naturalistic environment, we observe
the same enhanced effort toward a preferred food observed
by Salamone, but this does not shift consumption, preference
or behavioral choice but reflects different energy expenditure
strategies.
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INTEGRATING REWARD AND BEHAVIORAL ENERGY
MANAGEMENT
These findings are difficult to explain solely in terms of current
theories of dopamine and reward. (1) Rather than increasing
the impact of reward on behavior, we observe a reduced cou-
pling between reward history and choice, suggesting dopamine
induces greater exploration; that is, less biasing of choice by
reward. (2) Rather than over-riding homeostatic mechanisms
and promoting excess consumption, dopamine appears to work
within the constraints of homeostatic regulation, altering the
distribution of effort in pursuit of food without changing over-
all consumption; that is, dopamine induces greater vigor but
not greater “wanting.” (3) Rather than shifting effort, consump-
tion, and behavioral choice to more preferred foods, dopamine
again increases vigor without altering consumption, preference or
choice; that is, the apparent decreased sensitivity to costs does not
shift appetitive goals. The studies described all point to a common
theme: that dopamine is modulating behavioral energy expendi-
ture. Dopamine modulation of effort and expenditure has been
viewed as either a non-specific effect—“generalized activity”—
and/or as a reallocation of effort that overcomes response-costs
associated with pursuing goals (Salamone et al., 2007). In the
remainder of the paper, we will attempt to integrate the reward
and activity modulating aspects of dopamine. To do so, we will
develop an alternative perspective: the effects of dopamine on
reward arise secondary to and in the service of regulating behav-
ioral energy expenditure, placing the reward system within a
larger context of reconciling energy expenditure with available
resources.
DOPAMINE: A BEHAVIORAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Energy and its use is the final bottom line for adaptation.
All organismal needs and functions, from thermoregulation to
reproduction to procurement of energy itself, require energy.
Maintaining an adequate supply might be thought of as an evo-
lutionary prime directive. Much focus has been given to systems
that regulate the pursuit, consumption and storage of energy,
but much less attention to systems that control its expendi-
ture. Yet, aside from being an “equal partner” in determining
energy balance (i.e., consumption—expenditure = net balance),
achieving an optimal distribution of energy to different activi-
ties is critical to adaptation. That is, what an animal does with
its available energy is arguably as important as acquiring energy.
How to best direct energy expenditure, however, is contingent
upon environmental conditions. In an energy rich environment,
exploration, exercise, and energy expenditure is adaptive. In an
energy poor environment, exploitation of prior experience and
energy conservation—getting the most bang for one’s proverbial
energy buck—is essential. In this view, effective energy manage-
ment entails deciding (1) how much energy do I have to expend
and (2) how carefully, or selectively, do I need to deploy it. We
characterize these two questions as two axes of energy manage-
ment: expend vs. conserve and explore vs. exploit, respectively
(Figure 1).
In the current hypothesis, we associate these two axes of energy
expenditure with two well-documented dopamine functions.
First, we link to dopamine’s role in regulating generalized
activity to the expend-conserve axes. Second, we suggest that
dopamine’s role in reward is not to modulate reward incentive
FIGURE 1 | Two axes conceptual framework for regulation of
behavioral energy expenditure by dopamine. The horizontal
axes represents dopamine’s role in regulating generalized activity
levels along a continuum from low activity (conserve) to high activity
(expend). The vertical axes represent the role of dopamine in regulating
the balance between exploration and exploitation by modulating the
degree to which reward information biases the distribution of behavioral
activity. “Dopamine function” is construed broadly here and may include
not only extracellular concentrations of dopamine in target regions,
activity of dopamine neurons (i.e., rate of tonic activity, prevalence of
bursting) but also parameters such as relative expression of different
receptors (e.g., D1 and D2), expression and activity of the doapmine
transporter (DAT) as well as properties of vesicular release, including
size of readily releaseable pool and vesicle size. As a general conceptual
principle, we associate reduced dopamine function with conservation and
exploitation (lower left quadrant) and increased dopamine function with
expenditure and exploration (upper right quadrant), as reflected by the
larger arrow. However, alterations of different aspects of the dopamine
system (for example, shifting the relative expression of D1 and D2 receptors)
may shift this relationship, generating behavior described by the other
quadrants, such as high expenditure coupled with a greater exploitation of
reward information (lower right quadrant).
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and appetitive pursuit per se, but to use reward information to
regulate the distribution of energy to different activities, mediat-
ing the explore-exploit axes; that is, how selectively should energy
be deployed? We frame this second aspect of dopamine within
TD learning models of dopamine and reward where dopamine
mediates both (1) learning about reward—that is, assigning value
to stimuli that directs energy expenditure and (2) the degree to
which that reward information biases behavioral choice, con-
struing the second axis, explore-exploit, as energetic thrift: how
carefully do I need to exploit my available resources?
By emphasizing the management of energy expenditure rather
than reward modulation as a primary function of dopamine,
many otherwise hard to reconcile observations can cohere into
a central organizing metaphor for understanding the role of
dopamine in behavior. In the following sections, we briefly detail
the core elements of this hypothesis in the context of current ideas
and literature about dopamine.
It should be noted that the dopamine system is complex and
multi-faceted. Aside from extracellular dopamine concentrations
and rates of tonic and phasic dopamine cell firing, “dopamine
function” can include modulation of release at its targets, mod-
ulation of synthesis, vesicular packaging and readily releasable
pools, changes in receptor expression and function and alter-
ations in dopamine transporter and reuptake. As a necessary
simplification for the purposes of exposition, we will speak of
“high” and “low” dopamine function, a not uncommon prac-
tice in the literature. The complexities this obscures represent
potential mechanisms by which the dopamine system can exert
more nuanced, flexible and sophisticated regulation of its func-
tion(s). In Figure 1, it is these complexities that allow us to
consider dopamine not as a single line from high to low (as
shown in the middle) but as a more complex function that could
potentially range across the two-dimensional space portrayed.
Understanding these complexities, however, depends upon an
interpretative framework aroundwhich to organize more detailed
information. Here we focus on articulating a skeletal alternative
framework and do not attempt to assimilate everything known
about dopamine nor detail every mechanism potentially involved
in dopamine signaling, an intractable challenge for a single paper.
DOPAMINE: MEDIATING BETWEEN THE INTERNAL AND
EXTERNAL WORLDS
The dopamine system is interposed between two worlds of stim-
uli: the external and internal. On one hand, dopamine modulates
an organism’s response to environmental stimuli. In the reinforce-
ment learning perspective of dopamine and reward (Montague
et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997), dopamine critically mediates
learning about the value of stimuli (state) and which responses
(actions) are optimal (Reynolds et al., 2001; Schultz, 2002;
McClure et al., 2003; Daw and Doya, 2006; Day and Carelli,
2007; Day et al., 2010; Flagel et al., 2010; Gan et al., 2010;
Day et al., 2011). The incentive-salience perspective argues that
dopamine scales the incentive value associated with environmen-
tal stimuli, altering the degree to which stimuli bias behavioral
choice (Phillips et al., 2003; Berridge, 2004; Roitman et al., 2004;
Cagniard et al., 2006b; Day et al., 2006; Cheer et al., 2007). In
both cases, though mechanistically very different, dopamine is
modulating the organism’s response to environmental stimuli, the
world outside.
More recent work has demonstrated complex interactions
between the dopamine and homeostatic systems that monitor
and signal information about the internal organismal milieu
(Davis et al., 2010a; de Araujo et al., 2010; Figlewicz and Sipols,
2010; Opland et al., 2010; Vucetic and Reyes, 2010). Midbrain
dopamine neurons express receptors for numerous circulat-
ing signals associated with homeostatic mechanisms, including
leptin, ghrelin, orexin, and insulin (for extensive review, Figlewicz
and Sipols, 2010). In addition to direct sensing of homeostatic
signals, dopamine nuclei receive projections from various sub-
strates associated with homeostatic control mechanisms, includ-
ing hypothalamic projections (Opland et al., 2010). It is widely
believed that these inputs modulate reward processes. For exam-
ple, it is frequently proposed that circulating leptin decreases
dopamine activity that in turn diminishes the reward value of
food, consequently reducing appetitive behavior (Morton et al.,
2009; Davis et al., 2010a; Figlewicz and Sipols, 2010; Opland et al.,
2010; Vucetic and Reyes, 2010). The exact role of these home-
ostatic inputs remains controversial. The key point here is that
the dopamine system receives substantial information about the
internal milieu and homeostatic state of the organism, putting
it in a position to exploit the organisms knowledge of its envi-
ronment in accordance with internal needs and demands; that is,
to modulate behavior to optimize the relationship between these
two worlds, the inner and outer, organism and world. Of course,
in a sense the entire brain has evolved to mediate between the
inner and outer worlds, but the broad and diffuse projections of
the dopamine system, together with the diverse inputs that con-
verge upon it and its apparent role in modulating a wide array
of behaviors and processes, from motivation to motor execution
together with being highly conserved across species suggests it
may, in fact, have evolved to play some fundamental, critical role
in adaptation.
DOPAMINE: PUTTING DESIRE ON A BUDGET
Few would argue with this notion that dopamine integrates inter-
nal and external information to adapt behavior to environmental
conditions and optimally meet organismal needs. The difficult
question is how does dopamine achieve this? That is, what is the
primary effector mechanism by which dopamine adapts behav-
ior? The prevailing view, almost hegemonic, is that dopamine
modulates reward processes—regardless of whether it mediates
learning about reward, the expression of incentive or some com-
bination of both—and consequently shapes motivation: the goals
and activities an organism pursues and the vigor with which these
are pursued. Critically, the locus of modulation is appetitive: how
much reward induces its pursuit.
Though much less discussed, dopamine also modulates activ-
ity levels. Consistent with this modulation of activity, Salamone
and colleagues have long argued that dopamine can modulate
both effort toward a goal (Salamone et al., 1997, 2005, 2009a)
as well as generalized activity levels (Cousins et al., 1993; Correa
et al., 2002), observations central to the current hypothesis.
We will argue that dopamine regulates energy expenditure to
reconcile behavior with energy resources; that is, dopamine does
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not modulate desire, it puts it on an energy budget. In this view,
energy availability, not reward, is the primary factor influencing
dopaminergic regulation of behavior. In the following sections we
will elaborate this energy management hypothesis of dopamine
discussing first effector mechanisms by which dopamine regulates
energy expenditure followed by a discussion of mechanisms by
which the dopamine system regulates the distribution of energy
using reward information. After elaborating the hypothesis, we
will focus specifically on an alternative account of the role of
dopamine in obesity.
AXIS I: CONSERVE-EXPEND
In the following sections, we will detail the role of dopamine in
modulating energy expenditure along a continuum of conserva-
tion and expenditure. In the view developed, regulating energy
expenditure—both generalized activity and effort toward partic-
ular goals—is fundamentally independent of reward and depends
instead on available energy resources. Reward, we will argue, plays
a distinct role in determining the distribution or allocation of that
energy expenditure, represented by the explore-exploit axis and
discussed in section “Axis II: Explore-exploit.”
DOPAMINE AND GENERALIZED ACTIVITY: SPEND OR SAVE?
Elevated dopamine has been associated with increased activ-
ity for decades. Drugs that increase dopamine release, such
as amphetamine, cocaine or dopamine reuptake inhibitors,
increase generalized activity in humans and rodents (Kelly, 1975;
Mogenson et al., 1980; Beninger, 1983; Ahlenius et al., 1987;
Carlsson, 1993; Xu et al., 1994; Sedelis et al., 2000; Correa
et al., 2002; David et al., 2005; Viggiano, 2008; Charntikov et al.,
2011). Administration of D1 agonists or antagonists increase
and decrease activity, respectively. D2 acting drugs act post-
synaptically on medium spiny neurons in the inhibitory, indirect
pathway; however, they also act pre-synaptically on dopamine
and glutamate terminals and as autoreceptors on dopamine cell
bodies. As a consequence, low doses of quinpirole, a D2 ago-
nist, will depress activity presumably decreasing dopamine release
through autoreceptor activation while high doses of quinpirole
increase activity, presumably through activation of postsynaptic
D2 receptors that decrease activity in the inhibitory, indirect path-
way (Lomanowska et al., 2004). In rodents, some addictive drugs
of abuse that are CNS depressants (e.g., morphine) increase activ-
ity, an effect believed to arise from increased dopamine release
(Koek et al., 2012). Drugs that block dopamine reuptake increase
activity (Billes and Cowley, 2008; Young et al., 2010) and DAT
expression correlates with locomotor activity. Mice with reduced
expression of the dopamine transporter, resulting in elevated
tonic dopamine, are hyperactive (Cagniard et al., 2006a).
Though there is no doubt that dopamine modulates gener-
alized activity, the mechanism by which it does so is poorly
understood. In fact, there is no general framework for con-
ceptualizing what, exactly, “generalized activity” or arousal is
in the first place (Quinkert et al., 2011). In rodents, general-
ized activity is typically measured using either the open-field,
running wheels or homecage activity monitors. The degree to
which each reflects a general activity level is debated (Dishman,
2008; Viggiano, 2008; Hesse et al., 2010; Garland et al., 2011).
The open-field, for example, can be viewed as a measure of
general activity, exploratory behavior or “emotionality.” The run-
ning wheel, because running is highly reinforcing in rodents
(Wagner, 2005; Brené et al., 2007; Greenwood et al., 2011), may
be confounded with reward processes. Nonetheless, increasing
dopamine increases activity on all three measures and conversely,
decreasing dopamine decreases activity on all three measures
(Ahlenius et al., 1987; Zhuang et al., 2001; Correa et al., 2002;
Leng et al., 2004; Beeler et al., 2006, 2009; Dishman, 2008;
Kitanaka et al., 2012).
Rather than viewing “generalized activity” as distinct from
goal-oriented, reward-driven behavior, an alternative perspective
would be that dopamine signals energy availability and induces
energy expenditure, whether that be directed toward a reward-
ing, reinforced activity such as wheel running (or lever pressing),
toward exploration such as in the open field or merely mov-
ing around doing more mouse-like stuff day to day in the home
cage. As psychostimulant users for decades attest: dopamine is
energizing. Thus, the effect of dopamine on generalized activ-
ity represents a fundamental effector in the regulation of energy
expenditure by up- or down-regulating how much energy is
expended in behavioral activity independent of how that activity
may be directed: independent of reward.
DOPAMINE AND EFFORT: HOWMUCH CAN I AFFORD?
The literature is replete with evidence that increased dopamine
increases effort in pursuit of goals, canonically illustrated by
increased performance in progressive ratio paradigms where after
each reward earned, the cost of each subsequent reward increases
(Hodos, 1961). Historically, the effort a subject makes in a pro-
gressive ratio test has been construed as a measure of reinforcer
efficacy: that is, how hard I work is a measure of how valuable or
motivating the reward is (Madden et al., 2007a,b). This is anal-
ogous to assessing the value of something according to the price
someone is willing to pay.
However, breakpoint implicitly measures a cost-benefit deter-
mination (Salamone et al., 2009a). Though dopamine con-
tributes to this on-going determination, it’s role remains unclear
(Salamone et al., 1997; Roesch et al., 2007; Day et al., 2010, 2011;
Ostlund et al., 2010). On one hand, as argued in the incentive-
salience theory, dopamine may enhance the incentive properties
of stimuli associated with reward, essentially increasing the per-
ceived benefit (Berridge, 2007; Gan et al., 2010). On the other
hand, Salamone and colleagues argue that dopamine reduces sen-
sitivity to costs, thus reducing the cost component (Salamone,
2011, see also Phillips et al., 2007). In both cases, the result
is increased pursuit of reward arising from altered cost-benefit
determination, observed as an elevated breakpoint. In the con-
ventional progressive ratio paradigm, it is difficult to discern
these two possibilities as the behavioral outcome would look
the same: increased effort and responding. The home cage stud-
ies reviewed above, however, can distinguish between these two
alternatives. If increased dopamine were increasing sensitivity to
reward, inducing greater “wanting” and up-regulating appetitive
motivation, then we would expect to see greater consumption and
enhanced preference for more rewarding foods. We observed nei-
ther. Instead, we observed similar consumption, preference, and
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behavioral choices but a shift in foraging strategies toward greater
energy expenditure. However, it would be incorrect to say that the
DATkd mice are insensitive to costs; they adjust their consump-
tion and effort in response to escalating cost just like the wild-type
mice. Moreover, in the cheap-expensive lever switching paradigm,
if the levers do not switch, the DATkd mice prefer the cheap lever
identically to the wild-type. Rather, increased dopamine appears
to shift foraging strategy toward greater energy expenditure.
In determining the optimal trade-off between cost and benefit,
both factors are situationally contingent. On one hand, bene-
fit is contingent upon need. A food pellet will be much more
valuable and motivating to a hungry mouse than a sated one.
The role that motivational state plays in determining reward and
reinforcement has a long history in psychology and neuroscience
(Berridge, 2004) and represents an active area of investigation
(Dayan and Balleine, 2002; Balleine, 2005; Fontanini and Katz,
2009; Haase et al., 2009). Much less appreciated, however, is
that the evaluation of cost may also be contingent. Specifically,
the cost associated with any expenditure depends upon available
resources. The cost of a $12.00 airport hot dog is not evaluated
the same by a millionaire CEO and a poor graduate student. With
rodents, similar resource contingencies may apply. For example,
delay costs may be more significant if only a limited amount of
time is available (such as in one hour operant sessions) for obtain-
ing reward. Similarly, the cost associated with lever presses may
depend upon the general availability of energy to a mouse. So if
dopamine reduces cost sensitivity, there are two interpretations.
In the first, cost sensitivity is decreased relative to benefit; that is,
when cost and reward are compared, dopamine diminishes the
cost factor in order to favor reward (functionally equivalent to
increasing the incentive value). In the second, dopamine mod-
ulates cost-sensitivity relative to available resources. If energy is
abundantly available, effort costs are discounted.
Thus, we argue that the dopamine regulation of effort is inde-
pendent of reward value; that is, dopamine’s effects on effort
reflect a direct modulation of energy expenditure in relation to
available energy resources rather than an indirect consequence of
modulating a trade-off between cost and reward. As dopamine
increases energy expenditure generally, as discussed above, so it
increases energy expenditure—or vigor of goal pursuit—in spe-
cific activities, again, we argue, independent of reward value: if you
have energy, use it.
AXIS II: EXPLORE-EXPLOIT
In the following sections we argue that reward serves a central
function in the dopamine mediated management of energy: con-
trolling the distribution of energy expenditure, which we represent
with the explore-exploit axis (Figure 1). In this view, learned
reward value(s) determines the relative utility of different activ-
ities; however, what is crucially captured in this axis is the degree
to which these values (and the contrast between them) actually
bias and shape behavioral choices. We integrate into this axis
reinforcement learning and incentive-salience perspectives argu-
ing that phasic dopamine mediates learning about and updating
reward values, as widely believed, while tonic dopamine, as incen-
tive views suggest, scales the impact of these values on behavioral
choice, the expression of learned values. We reconceptualize this
incentive scaling formally as a function within reinforcement
learning that regulates the degree to which prior reward learning
biases choice; that is, how much established learning is exploited.
We assign this latter function to tonic dopamine and construe
it as regulating thrift; that is, regulating the frugality of energy
expenditure.
DOPAMINE AND GOAL SELECTION: MAKING WISE CHOICES IN
ENERGY EXPENDITURE
The frugality of one’s expenditures depends upon the resources
available. A rich person need not quibble about thousands of
dollars while a poor person needs to count pennies. Similarly, ani-
mals living in energetic environments of plenty need not worry
about energy conservation while those living under conditions
of scarcity must expend energy judiciously. Thus, energy man-
agement entails not only determining the overall magnitude of
energy expenditure, as discussed above, but also its allocation to
specific activities.
We start from the premise that when energy is readily available,
energy expenditure is adaptively advantageous, for two primary
reasons. First, physical activity has been shown in countless stud-
ies to contribute significantly to health and longevity (Holloszy
et al., 1985; Samorajski et al., 1985; Paffenbarger et al., 1986;
Holloszy, 1988; Helmrich et al., 1991; Greendale et al., 1995;
Booth et al., 2000; Alevizos et al., 2005; LaMonte et al., 2005;
Warburton et al., 2006; Gaesser, 2007; Huffman et al., 2008;
Hawley and Holloszy, 2009; Mercken et al., 2012). Under condi-
tions of scarcity, animals have to work hard to find food; however,
under conditions of plenty they do not. A system that increased
energy expenditure in response to conditions of plenty would
maintain activity levels and health, at the very least precluding
an animal from becoming a fat, slow morsel for a predator’s din-
ner. Moreover, if energy is available, then there is an informational
advantage to be gained from exploration that allows an animal to
more fully learn about its environment, information that could be
exploited in the future (Behrens et al., 2007). Thus, when energy
is available, there is logic to inducing expenditure and behavioral
exploration. In contrast, when energy is scarce, the animal needs
to conserve its energy and maximally exploit its knowledge of the
environment. In the hypothesis being developed here, dopamine’s
role in reward processes arises as a mechanism for the allocation
of energy toward specific activities and stimuli.
To optimally allocate energy, two primary functions are
required. First, the organism has to determine the value of stimuli
and actions in the first place. Second, the organism needs to deter-
mine to what degree those values should be taken into account
whenmaking behavioral choices: how frugal or “value-conscious”
should expenditure be? The two umbrella views of dopamine
and reward, the reinforcement learning and the incentive-salience
hypotheses, provide these two functions. In the sections below
we examine both functions and their contribution to the explore-
exploit axis (Figure 1) cast in terms of TD learning models.
DOPAMINE AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: VALUE ACCOUNTING
As noted in the introduction, the term “reward” can be ambigu-
ous. Here we adopt an information perspective and define
reward as positively valenced outcome information. The primary
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question to be addressed is what role dopamine plays in linking
reward history to future choices. Reinforcement learning per-
spectives argue that dopamine modulates corticostriatal plasticity
in response to reward, i.e., positive outcome information, thus
mediating learning about stimuli and actions that are valuable.
Motivational views, specifically incentive-salience, suggest that
dopamine modulates the expression of previously learned values
(incentive). The current hypothesis encompasses both within a
TD learning framework.
Temporal difference models are a class of reinforcement learn-
ing algorithms that have been successfully applied to under-
standing how neural substrates, such as dopamine and the basal
ganglia, mediate behaviorally observed reinforcement learning.
Within these models, stimuli and actions are assigned a “value”
that incorporates all expected future rewards associated with
those stimuli or actions. As time unfolds and the animal moves
incrementally forward in time, advancing through successive
states (i.e., configurations of stimuli, actions, rewards), at each
step forward the prior prediction (t − 1) is compared to what
was actually received at time t plus remaining expected rewards
in the future, that is, the value estimate at t. If there is a dis-
crepancy, called a prediction error, the prior value at t − 1 is
adjusted so that when that state is encountered again, it will be
more accurate. When the animal moves forward in time to t +
1, the same process will occur, this time adjusting the predicted
value of t by comparing it to actual reward at t + 1 plus the future
expected value of t + 1, and so on. The name TD arises because
an entire succession of states, each with its own value prediction
of “remaining” future reward, is adjusted one step at a time. It is
this collection of values associated with different states—stimuli
and actions—that enables accurate prediction of future reward.
In short, it is an algorithm that facilitates trial and error learning
where the animal is always, as it were, in medias res, and an accu-
rate estimate of the value of particular stimuli and actions accrues
gradually over time through experience.
Temporal difference models have two key functions. First, they
learn. As described above, using an update rule based on predic-
tion errors, they adjust prior values associated with stimuli and
actions. Second, they make decisions. That is, once you have a set
of values, there is a rule for how those values are used in selecting
an action. These two functions are associated with two parame-
ters, commonly known as alpha, the learning rate, and beta, the
“temperature,” respectively. The learning rate determines to what
degree new information alters established values, both weight-
ing new information against old and establishing a “window of
forgetting.” The temperature parameter determines the degree
to which current value information (i.e., reward history) biases
action selection, frequently referred to as the “explore-exploit”
parameter.
Substantial evidence supports a role for dopamine in medi-
ating reinforcement learning and corticostriatal plasticity, which
will not be reviewed here (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al.,
1997; Reynolds and Wickens, 2002; Schultz, 2002, 2010; Cannon
and Palmiter, 2003; Wise, 2004; Berridge, 2007; Goto et al., 2007;
Redish et al., 2007; Robbins and Roberts, 2007; Salamone, 2007;
Schultz, 2007; Dayan and Niv, 2008; Kheirbek et al., 2008, 2009;
Redgrave et al., 2008; Kurth-Nelson and Redish, 2009; Lovinger,
2010; Lüscher and Malenka, 2011). This learning function has
been primarily associated with phasic dopamine activity operat-
ing on a millisecond timescale and is not believed to represent
reward directly. Instead, drawing from TD learning as described
above, phasic dopamine is believed to encode prediction errors.
By signaling unanticipated reward or the failure of expected
reward (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2007; Flagel et al., 2010;
Brown et al., 2011; Day et al., 2011), phasic dopamine updates
the values associated with stimuli and actions by altering synap-
tic weights through its effects on corticostriatal plasticity. Within
the current hypothesis, we accept and view this function of phasic
dopamine in updating value as, in a sense, an accounting func-
tion: dopamine does not set, create or arbitrarily scale value but
is functionally providing a teaching signal to modify learning to
accurately reflect the value associated with stimuli and actions.
Put simply, this function of dopamine is trying to “get the value
right”: a fundamental characteristic of any successful budget is
getting the numbers right. That is, the highly detailed and mech-
anistic functions of dopamine in reinforcement learning enables
an animal learn about its environment in order to better allocate
and utilize its available energy.
DOPAMINE AND INCENTIVE-SALIENCE: ENERGY BUDGET ALLOCATION
The incentive-salience view of dopamine, in contrast, argues
that dopamine scales the impact of reward-associated stimuli on
behavioral choice (Cagniard et al., 2006b; Berridge, 2007). That is,
dopamine modulates the degree to which incentive value associ-
ated with stimuli biases behavior. Generally, increased dopamine
is viewed as increasing incentive and scaling up appetitive behav-
ior; that is, inducing greater “wanting.” This view is consistent
with the decades of literature showing increased dopamine results
in increased goal pursuit and effort, as discussed above. In
essence, this might be conceptualized as increased exploitation
of reward learning: reward value exerts a greater bias on behav-
ioral choice. However, if increasing dopamine results in increased
exploitation, onemight logically expect that decreasing dopamine
would result in greater exploration; that is, behavior will be less
biased by reward information. However, to our knowledge, no
data have demonstrated increased exploration as a consequence
of diminished dopamine. Instead, decreased dopamine has been
consistently associated with decreased activity and exploratory
behavior. In the behavioral flexibility home cage study described
above, we found that elevated dopamine decreased coupling
between reward history and choice, favoring exploration, not
exploitation, consistent with decades of open-field studies show-
ing increased exploratory activity as a consequence of increased
dopamine (e.g., Zhuang et al., 2001). Consistent with the cur-
rent hypothesis, recent computational work by Humphries and
colleagues (Humphries et al., 2012) demonstrate that tonic
dopamine can modulate the trade-off between exploration and
exploitation. In their model, the effects of dopamine on this
trade-off are complex and concentration-dependent, but indicate
that high dopamine can induce exploratory behavior.
We propose that the incentive-salience view of dopamine,
where dopamine scales the degree to which reward value influ-
ences behavioral choice, captures a critical effector mecha-
nism in dopaminergic management of energy expenditure. By
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modulating the balance between exploration and exploitation,
dopamine regulates the frugality of energy expenditure. In con-
trast to current theories of incentive-salience, however, we argue
that dopamine acts roughly in the opposite direction from what is
widely construed: dopamine favors exploration; that is, diminished
biasing of behavioral choice by reward value, though as the work
of Humphries et al. (Humphries et al., 2012) demonstrates, the
precise operation of this function of dopamine is likely to be com-
plex. The increased effort in reward pursuit observed by enhanced
dopamine function, in this view, arises not as a consequence of
enhanced reward value but as the result of a dopaminergic signal
to expend energy and be less frugal in the pursuit of goals.
Although, through its role in reinforcement learning, (pha-
sic) dopamine contributes to learning about value, the range of
the vertical axes in Figure 1 does not represent value per se, from
lesser to greater value, but the degree to which established val-
ues bias or direct behavioral choice, ranging on a continuum
from heavily influencing choice (exploit) to minimal influence
(explore). This could be construed as a frugality axis where
greater exploitation maximizes reward for energy expended while
reduced exploitation facilitates exploration and greater energy
expenditure.
How and to what extent learned values direct behavioral
choices clearly depends upon many factors, most obviously the
motivational state of the organism, the “salience” in “incentive-
salience,” taking into account the organism’s internal environ-
ment. The external environment needs to be taken into account
as well, specifically the availability of reward, particularly energy.
As discussed above, the richness of the environment determines
how frugal an animal needs to be with its energy expenditure
and how much it needs to maximally exploit prior learning. Niv
et al. (2007) have suggested that tonic dopamine encodes average
reward over time, a formalization that links the relative abun-
dance or scarcity of reward in an environment to behavioral vigor.
In the model proposed by Niv, higher average reward induces
greater behavioral vigor to reduce opportunity costs; that is, the
more rich the environment, the more that is lost by inactivity, col-
orfully described as “the cost of sloth.” Focusing specifically on
energy availability, we share this view that tonic dopamine signals
the abundance or scarcity of energy in the environment over time.
However, in the current view, rather than viewing the increased
vigor associated with dopamine as inducing greater exploitation
to reduce opportunity costs, we suggest that increased dopamine
reflects energy abundance and induces greater energy expenditure
but less exploitation; that is, less energy frugal behavior, favoring
exploration (but not inactivity).
Finally, it is widely believed that learned values can be part of
a goal-directed or a habit system (Daw et al., 2005; Balleine et al.,
2007), associated frequently with the dorsomedial and dorsolat-
eral striatum, respectively (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; Balleine and
O’Doherty, 2010). In TD models, the latter is cast as a “cache”
or “model-free” system where the value of stimuli and actions
are inscrutable; that is, how those values were derived is not
available for examination. In contrast, goal-directed behavior is
associated with “model-based” systems where a “tree” of states
and their associated value are explicitly represented such that the
animal can deliberately search the tree to determine how value
at any leaf is derived and evaluate those values against current
motivational states. In contrast, the habit, or cache system is
thought to be insensitive to motivational state, though impor-
tantly, not insensitive to new learning (Balleine and O’Doherty,
2010). Precisely because the cached value cannot be “examined”
with regard to current goals, habitual behavior based on cached
values will be emitted in response to stimuli presentation even
in the absence of motivation until the cached value driving that
behavior is updated. In TD models, the temperature parame-
ter adjusts the degree to which values bias behavior without
regard to the source of those values, i.e., whether they are part
of a cache, model-free or model-based system. The question
arises, then, as to whether the dopamine regulation of explore-
exploit, suggested here, applies equally to both the habit and
goal-directed system, a question we cannot answer. Insofar as
reduced dopamine may induce exploitation, thrift, and conser-
vation, increasing the control prior learning has over behavior,
reward/energy poor environments and hypodopaminergia may,
by increasing the influence of established learning and values on
behavior, increase the control exerted by habit based systems,
though this clearly requires further investigation.
DOPAMINE AND SHIFTING ENERGY EXPENDITURE: REVISITING
THE GO AND NOGO PATHWAYS
A primary target of dopamine, widely associated with dopamine’s
role in both reward and motor control, is the striatum (Albin
et al., 1989, 1995; Alexander et al., 1990; Mink, 1996; Everitt
and Robbins, 2005; Cagniard et al., 2006b; Balleine et al., 2007;
Nicola, 2007; DeLong and Wichmann, 2009; Wise, 2009; Haber
and Knutson, 2010; Humphries and Prescott, 2010; Sesack and
Grace, 2010). The striatum is the main entry point for cortical
inputs (Bolam et al., 2000) that are processed through the basal
ganglia eventually returning to the cortex, comprising the well-
known re-entrant corticostriatal loops (Alexander et al., 1990;
Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Alexander, 1994; Middleton and
Strick, 2000; Haber, 2003; Lehéricy et al., 2005). Corticostriatal
processing occurs through two parallel pathways (excluding the
hyperdirect pathway), the direct and indirect that facilitate and
inhibit corticostriatal throughput (Albin et al., 1995;Mink, 1996),
respectively, sometimes referred to as the GO and NOGO path-
ways (Cohen and Frank, 2009). The GO pathway predominantly
expresses D1 while the NOGO expresses D2 (Surmeier et al.,
2007) such that an increase in dopamine activity enhances activ-
ity in the facilitatory GO pathway and diminishes activity in the
inhibitory NOGOpathway. Conversely, reduced dopamine results
in less GO activity and increased NOGO activity, an idea cen-
tral to classic models of motor slowing in Parkinson’s disease
(Albin et al., 1989; Mink, 1996). The classic functional explana-
tion for this dual pathway architecture is “focused selection,” the
idea that the GO pathway isolates and facilitates a selected motor
action while the NOGO pathway inhibits competing actions and
extraneous noise, thus enabling clean execution of actions (Mink,
1996).
This same architecture, however, can be construed as an effec-
tor mechanism for regulating energy expenditure. By shifting the
balance between the GO and NOGO pathways, dopamine regu-
lates both the total throughput of the corticostriatal system as well
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as modulating its selectivity (Beeler, 2011). Specifically, increased
dopamine favors the GO pathway and diminishes the NOGO
pathway. This results in greater overall corticostriatal through-
put and greater exploration as the potential actions represented
in corticostriatal input to the GO pathway face less opposition in
the inhibitory NOGO pathway, reducing constraints on selecting
actions. In contrast, when dopamine decreases, there is greater
inhibitory, NOGO activity resulting in overall less corticostri-
atal throughput and greater exploitation as the actions selected
through the GO pathway must be sufficiently strong to overcome
the inhibitory influence of the NOGO pathway (for a learning
perspective on this, see Frank et al., 2009). This provides a basis
for understanding how elevated dopamine can increase activ-
ity overall as well as decrease the selectivity of that activity, i.e.,
increase energy expenditure and exploration. In contrast, reduced
dopamine would decrease overall activity but increase selec-
tivity, resulting in decreased energy expenditure and increased
exploitation (Figure 2). A more detailed discussion of the role(s)
of dopamine in modulating corticostriatal throughput can be
found elsewhere (Beeler, 2011). This dual pathway architecture,
then, provides a potential basis for modulating energy expendi-
ture along the two axes described: regulating overall, generalized
activity (conserve-expend) on one hand and, on the other hand,
regulating the degree to which prior learning about reward is
exploited, the explore-exploit axes.
DOPAMINE AND ITS DIVERSE TARGETS: ORCHESTRATION OR
EVOLUTIONARY BRIC-A-BRAC?
In the previous section, we focus on dopamine actions in the
striatum, widely construed as a primary substrate for reinforce-
ment learning and implicated in both motivation and motor
control. Dopamine, however, projects broadly across the brain,
with important projections, for example, to the prefrontal cor-
tex. Moreover, aside from the widely studied nigrostriatal and
mesoaccumbens pathways, projecting to the dorsal and ventral
striatum and associated with motor control and habit, and moti-
vation, respectively, there are much less studied dopamine nuclei,
including those associated with the hypothalamus, all of which
may (or may not) contribute to energy management in poten-
tially different ways. The development of a dopamine and energy
management hypothesis demands asking how dopamine modu-
lation in different targets may contribute to coordinated energy
management. At this point, we cannot reasonably speculate on
this question.
Reflecting on this question, however, provokes the question of
whether there really is some overriding “function” of dopamine
at all? Or has dopamine acquired various, unrelated functions so
that the notion of a finding “the” function of dopamine repre-
sents a fool’s errand: perhaps the dopamine functions we observe
today evolved as patchwork, evolutionary bric-a-brac, an oppor-
tunistic collection of fortuitous adaptations. From the literature,
FIGURE 2 | Role of direct and indirect pathway modulation
of corticostriatal throughput in regulating the energy expenditure.
The striatum modulates cortical processing via corticostriatal-thalamocortical
loops through the basal gangia through two pathways, the direct,
nigrostriatal (“GO”) and the indirect, striatopallidal (“NOGO”), expressing
predominantly D1 and D2 dopamine receptors, respectively. Acting on
D1 in the GO pathway (red toned boxes), dopamine disinhibits
corticostriatal throughput facilitating activity while dopamine activation
of D2 inhibits the NOGO pathway (blue toned boxes), also facilitating
activity by dampening the inhibitory influence of the indirect. Conversely,
decreases in dopamine diminish D1 mediated disinhibition of the GO
pathway and D2 mediated inhibition of the NOGO pathway, both
serving to restrict corticostriatal throughput. These dopamine effects
are represented by green arrows for the GO pathways, indicating
facilitation of corticostriatal throughput and red stop arrows for the
NOGO pathway indicating inhibition of corticostriatal throughput. The
consequences of increased and decreased dopamine on the expenditure
and distribution of energy is summarized below with the two axes
(conserve-expend and explore-exploit) collapses on a single scale of
restrictive deployment of energy (constrained expenditure focused on
exploiting reward information) versus expansive energy expenditure (high
expenditure distributed liberally to behavioral activities, i.e., exploration),
where restrictive energy use is represented by blue and expansive energy
use by red.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 49 | 11
Beeler et al. Dopamine and energy management
one gets the sense that many believe there is an overall, grand
function of dopamine—most frequently, “reward” processing, in
some form or another. It seems not unreasonable to think that as
the function of a neurotransmitter elaborates and transforms over
evolution, those elaborations arise as variations on a theme, a fur-
ther enhancement of some function that has already conferred
adaptive fitness. Even if such a notion ultimately proves false,
seeking a “common thread” among seemingly diverse, unrelated
functions may provide deeper insight into how these apparently
disparate functions interact to contribute to behavioral adap-
tation. “Mediating reward,” as broad and ambiguous as it is,
has served as this common denominator in much of the litera-
ture and has yielded rich results. Here we suggest an alternative,
overarching function, energy management.
Returning to the question of how dopamine action at differ-
ent neural substrates might contribute to energy management,
we can only reflect back the question from the perspective of our
hypothesis. Energy management constitutes a fundamental bio-
logical process, much like reproduction, growth and responding
to stress, and requires coordinated activity across multiple sub-
strates in response to external conditions, in a way that reward,
an event in the external world, perhaps does not. This coordi-
nated orchestration of multiple substrates toward a single goal
or purpose is characteristic of hormones, such as reproductive
or stress hormones. Given dopamine’s diffuse projections and
actions on multiple targets, it is tempting to entertain the notion
that dopamine may have evolved a hormone-like function to
coordinate multiple neural substrates and orchestrate behavior
optimally adapted to the prevailing energy environment in which
the organism finds itself. Though admittedly broad and specula-
tive (but see Ugrumov et al., 2012), it is interesting to ask, then,
how dopamine modulation in the dorsal versus ventral stria-
tum, or in the prefrontal cortex versus the hypothalamus, might
represent the coordination of diverse neural substrates with dis-
parate functions toward a single purpose, adapting behavior to
the energy environment in which the organism must work out its
survival.
DOPAMINE AND OBESITY: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In recent years there has been an increased focus on the role
of dopamine in obesity with several high profile papers likening
overeating to a food addiction (Volkow and Wise, 2005; Trinko
et al., 2007; Avena et al., 2008; Corwin andGrigson, 2009; Dagher,
2009; Davis and Carter, 2009; Ifland et al., 2009; Pelchat, 2009;
Johnson and Kenny, 2010; Volkow et al., 2010). These theories
focus on the role of dopamine in mediating reward processes,
suggesting that in modern western cultures in which highly palat-
able foods are readily available, these tasty foods act similarly to
drugs of abuse and induce increased “wanting” that leads to a loss
of control over consumption, despite, like an addict, individual
intentions to curb caloric intake (Berridge et al., 2010; Berthoud
et al., 2011). There are two opposite takes on this (Davis et al.,
2007; Davis and Carter, 2009). In the first, increased dopamin-
ergic function arising from escalating reinforcement associated
with palatable food leads to increased motivation that overrides
normal homeostatic control (Finlayson et al., 2007; Zheng et al.,
2009; Avena and Bocarsly, 2011). In essence, we lose control in the
face of really tasty food, an effect believed to be mediated by the
persistent over-activation of dopamine. In contrast, a “reward-
deficiency” hypothesis has been proposed in which a deficit in
dopamine function results in diminished reward signaling which
generates excessive consumption as the person or animal tries
to “fill the reward void” (Wang et al., 2004; Geiger et al., 2009;
Kenny, 2010).
Within the current hypothesis, we posit that increased
dopamine facilitates greater energy expenditure and exploration,
i.e., less biasing of behavioral choice by reward, favoring less
energy storage and providing protection from obesity, consis-
tent with the well-known effects of psychostimulants in inducing
weight loss (Vanina et al., 2002; Leddy et al., 2004). In contrast,
decreased dopamine induces energy conservation and exploita-
tion i.e., greater biasing of behavior by reward. In this case,
energy consumption and storage is favored resulting in overeating
and weight gain. Notably, in contrast to psychostimulants, anti-
psychotics that antagonize dopamine (primarily D2) have been
consistently associated with weight gain for decades (Allison and
Casey, 2001; Vanina et al., 2002), though the exact mechanisms
remain uncertain.
LEPTIN, INSULIN, AND DOPAMINE: RECONCILING RESOURCES
AND EXPENDITURES
Observations of reduced dopamine function in obesity, partic-
ularly reduced expression of the D2 receptors, has generated
the reward deficiency hypothesis (Blum et al., 2000, 2011) in
which over-consumption is driven by an attempt to compen-
sate for reduced reward signaling. In the hypothesis proposed
here, we would reinterpret these data. When dopamine func-
tion is reduced, this favors energy conservation and exploitation
of reward information: that is, “consume and move as little as
possible,” an obvious recipe for obesity.
Motivational dissociation: needing without “wanting”
Decades of elegant work have demonstrated beyond question
that circulating hormones that signal energy supplies, particularly
insulin and leptin, contribute to the regulation of consumption
and body weight through actions on the central nervous system
[see Figlewicz and Sipols, 2010 for excellent review]. Consistent
with its role in mediating homeostatic energy balance, leptin, and
insulin act on multiple targets in the hypothalamus involved in
the regulation of feeding, including NPY, POMC, α-MSH, and
AgRP (Figlewicz and Sipols, 2010). These observations are con-
sistent with drive reduction theories of motivation where energy
deficit or surplus promotes or inhibits consumption, respectively.
The dramatic increase in obesity in recent years (Ford and
Mokdad, 2008), however, raises the question as to why these
homeostatic mechanisms apparently fail. It is widely believed that
midbrain dopamine systems that mediate incentive motivation—
motivation that arises from the reward value associated with
stimuli (including food) rather than from need state— mediates
this homeostatic failure by promoting so-called non-homeostatic
or hedonic feeding (Saper et al., 2002; Zheng and Berthoud,
2007; Lutter and Nestler, 2009; Zheng et al., 2009; Berthoud
et al., 2011). Considerable evidence suggests that both leptin and
insulin can modulate midbrain dopamine function (Krügel et al.,
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2003; Fulton et al., 2006; Hommel et al., 2006; Roseberry et al.,
2007; Leinninger et al., 2009) and alter food pursuit and con-
sumption (Sipols et al., 2000; Figlewicz et al., 2001, 2004, 2008,
2006; Hommel et al., 2006; Morton et al., 2009; Davis et al.,
2010b).
In the prevailing view, a great deal of data appears to suggest
that both insulin and leptin decrease dopamine function, decreas-
ing, in turn, incentive driven pursuit and consumption of food. In
essence, leptin and insulin, by signaling adequate energy, repre-
sent a functional satiety signal diminishing the reward associated
with food (Morton et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2010b; Figlewicz
and Sipols, 2010; Opland et al., 2010; Vucetic and Reyes, 2010).
Conversely, when energy is low, leptin, and insulin decline, dis-
inhibiting dopamine and promoting enhanced incentive/reward
driven food-seeking. This general idea is consistent with data
demonstrating that increasing leptin and insulin reduces reward-
driven behavior (Carr et al., 2000; Fulton et al., 2000; Sipols et al.,
2000; Figlewicz et al., 2004, 2006, 2007; Hommel et al., 2006;
Farooqi et al., 2007; Rosenbaum et al., 2008; Morton et al., 2009)
and, conversely, that food-restriction, associated with decreased
leptin/insulin (Havel, 2000), increases reward-driven behavior
(Carroll and Meisch, 1980; Carr, 2007, 2011; Davis et al., 2010a).
In short, by up and down regulating dopamine function, leptin
and insulin modulate the incentive associated with food and quite
possibly reward sensitivity generally (Morton et al., 2006; Davis
et al., 2010a). Though this account of leptin and dopamine is
intuitive, the story may nonetheless be more complex (Palmiter,
2007).
In the context of obesity, the relationship between lep-
tin/insulin, dopamine and reward behavior is paradoxical and
doesn’t conform to the idea just outlined. First, rather than the
expected increase in leptin/insulin signaling commensurate with
increased caloric intake and adiposity, obesity has been asso-
ciated with reduced sensitivity to leptin/insulin (Arase et al.,
1988; Lin et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2001b; Myers, 2004; Figlewicz
et al., 2006; Enriori et al., 2007; Davis et al., 2010a; Figlewicz
and Sipols, 2010; Koek et al., 2012). Second, while we might
expect this observed reduction in leptin/insulin sensitivity to
result in increased dopamine function, analogous to reduced
leptin/insulin signals in food-restriction, most studies report
decreased dopamine function in obesity (Di Chiara et al., 1998;
Wang et al., 2001a; Davis et al., 2008; Geiger et al., 2008, 2009;
Li et al., 2009; Vucetic and Reyes, 2010). Finally, one might
expect reduced dopaminergic function to result in decreased con-
sumption, as the evidence cited above suggest. Instead, reduced
dopamine and hyperphagia co-occur. In obesity, then, the lep-
tin/insulin -> dopamine -> reward chain is inverted at each
step.
The first two inversions highlight a critical distinction between
acute and chronic positive energy balance. Reduced sensitivity
to leptin/insulin is widely believed to arise as a consequence of
chronic positive energy balance, leading to obesity and metabolic
disorders, and representing a pathological adaptation. The para-
doxical reduction of dopamine function associated with obesity
despite reduced sensitivity to leptin/insulin is likely a (pathologi-
cal) adaptation as well, as frequently proposed in theories likening
obesity to addiction (Volkow and Wise, 2005; Trinko et al., 2007;
Avena et al., 2009; Lutter and Nestler, 2009; Avena and Bocarsly,
2011). This severely complicates investigation because it means
that for every observation of a relationship between energy intake,
leptin/insulin and dopamine we have to ask “does this observa-
tion reflect normal function or pathological adaptation?” This
situation increases the risk of making inappropriate inferences of
normal function from pathological conditions and vice-versa, an
issue addressed below (cage-induced obesity section).
The third inversion—that decreased dopamine function asso-
ciated with obesity promotes rather than inhibits consumption—
superficially contradicts the entire notion that dopamine
enhances incentive value. However, this may reflect the complex-
ity of neural substrates controlling consumption. In particular,
reduced incentive motivation and hyperphagia can coexist. Davis
et al. (Davis et al., 2010b) recently provide data suggesting that
leptin modulates dopamine through two mechanisms: direct sig-
naling through leptin receptors on midbrain dopamine cells
and indirectly through leptin expressing neuron in the lateral
hypothalamus to modulate dopamine cell activity. They suggest
that leptin’s actions on the LH regulate homeostatic motiva-
tion while its actions on midbrain dopamine regulate effort-
ful responding. Though these two mechanisms normally work
in concert, they can become dissociated such that consump-
tion and willingness to work for food are not correlated (e.g.,
Greenwood et al., 1974; Salamone et al., 1991; Baldo et al., 2002;
Davis et al., 2010b; Rasmussen et al., 2010). If non-homeostatic
feeding is effort to obtain food—“wanting”—in the absence of
need (Berridge et al., 2010), the pathological adaptation of lep-
tin/insulin/dopamine to obesity may reflect the opposite: a per-
ceived need to consume food without expending effort, needing
without “wanting.”
Dopamine and energy homeostasis: an expenditure-centric
perspective
This work described above focuses almost exclusively on con-
sumption, the intake side of energy balance. Leptin, though less
systematically investigated, also plays a role in regulating energy
expenditure (Pelleymounter et al., 1995; Williams et al., 2001;
Elmquist et al., 2005; Ludwig et al., 2005; van de Wall et al., 2008;
Leinninger et al., 2011; Ribeiro et al., 2011). However, despite
dopamine’s well-known role in regulating activity, little is known
about how the interactions between leptin, insulin and dopamine
modulate activity and energy expenditure. From the perspec-
tive of energy expenditure, one might expect that leptin/insulin,
signaling energy availability, would enhance energy expenditure
and increase activity (Ribeiro et al., 2011)—“if you got it, use
it”—which is inconsistent with observations that leptin decreases
dopamine function. However, recent work (Leinninger et al.,
2009; Opland et al., 2010) suggests the relationship between leptin
and dopamine may not be simple and unidirectional. Leinninger
and colleagues suggest that leptin acting on the LH increases
dopamine function (Leinninger et al., 2009) while activation of
leptin receptors on dopamine cells decreases dopamine func-
tion (Hommel et al., 2006; Figlewicz and Benoit, 2009). Leshan
et al. (2010) suggest that the dopamine cells that express leptin
receptors represents a small (∼10%) subpopulation that projects
almost exclusively to the central nucleus of the amygdala. When
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leptin increases from a surplus of energy, then, its primary effect
on dopamine, via LH, may be to increase dopamine function and
enhance activity and energy expenditure, as observed by Ribeiro
and colleauges (Ribeiro et al., 2011): energy is available, use it.
The dopamine cells and projection that directly express leptin
receptors may play a different role in appetitive learning— asso-
ciated with the CeN (Holland and Gallagher, 1993; Parkinson
et al., 2000; Connor et al., 2001; Baxter and Murray, 2002; Lee
et al., 2005; Paton et al., 2006; El-Amamy and Holland, 2007)—
an intriguing idea beyond the scope of the current discussion.
In the hypothesis proposed here, this leptin-mediated increase in
dopamine does not enhance reward, but rather shifts regulation
of activity toward greater expenditure and greater exploration.
Greater exploration results in an apparent reduction in reward
sensitivity/incentive as behavior is less biased by reward, though
importantly, still motivated.
The reward centric view of dopamine places the up- or down-
regulation of reward and incentive motivation as dopamine’s
primary contribution to energy homeostasis and obesity. The
current hypothesis centers the role of dopamine on energy expen-
diture and suggests that available energy normally increases
dopamine resulting in increased activity and exploration, where
the impact of reward on behavioral choice is actually dimin-
ished. Conversely, low energy would decrease dopamine, resulting
in energy conservation and exploitation of reward information
that is, increasing the impact of reward on behavior. The lat-
ter is consistent with observations often cited to support the
“reward deficiency” hypothesis but here we interpret these data as
reflecting a “reward exploit excess.” This hypothesis would suggest
that high caloric intake should increase dopamine and, through
increased activity, be protective against obesity. This putative
mechanism, however, does not appear any more successful than
homeostatic mechanisms in preventing obesity in our current
environment. Why?
THWARTING ENERGY EXPENDITURE: CUBICLE AND CAGE
INDUCED OBESITY
This hypothesis would predict that a ready supply of energy, as
is generally the case in modern western societies, would enhance
dopamine and facilitate energy expenditure, providing protec-
tion against obesity. Critically, this effect is contingent upon the
opportunity to expend energy. Dietary induced obesity (DIO) in
rodents fed high fat, high calorie diets is a prevalent model of
environmentally induced obesity. Though widely construed as a
model of obesogenic environments, rodents on such diets do not
universally become obese, showing degrees of resistance that vary
between strains (Brownlow et al., 1996; Funkat et al., 2004; Novak
et al., 2010) and between individuals, the basis for selective breed-
ing of obesity susceptible and resistant rodents (Levin, 2010).
Assessing the role of dopamine-mediated effects on energy expen-
diture in DIO is difficult as the question has not been investigated
directly.
Although wheel running has been shown to protect against
DIO in several models of obesity (Zachwieja et al., 1997; Levin
and Dunn-Meynell, 2004; Bi, 2005; Moran and Bi, 2006b;
Patterson et al., 2008, 2009; Meek et al., 2010; Novak et al.,
2010), the extent to which such protective voluntary activity is
modulated by dopamine has not been directly examined in these
studies. Obesity-prone OLEF rats show greatly decreased obe-
sity when provided running wheels (Bi, 2005). Interestingly, the
meal patterning of these rats, compared to controls, is analo-
gous to what we observe with the DAT mice: they consume
larger but fewer meals, though unlike the DAT their net con-
sumption is elevated (Moran and Bi, 2006a, p.1214, Figure 2).
Younger, non-diabetic OLETF rats show increased extracellular
dopamine, consistent with the DAT meal patterning phenotype
(Anderzhanova et al., 2007). However, at more advanced pre-
diabetic and diabetic ages, they show a dramatic decline in
dopamine (Anderzhanova et al., 2007). One interpretation of
these data is that elevated dopamine levels in these rats predis-
poses them to greater energy intake and expenditure but in the
absence of voluntary exercise opportunities, the increased energy
expenditure is blocked, resulting in energy imbalance, obesity,
and metabolic disorder.
Some studies have demonstrated that high fat/calorie diets
diminish dopamine function, including reduced TH, reduced
stimulated dopamine release and reduced D2 receptor expres-
sion (Geiger et al., 2008, 2009). However, whether the observed
reduction in dopamine function arises as a direct consequence
of the increased availability of energy or secondary to other
pathophysiology is unclear. Specifically, high fat/calorie diets have
been associated with leptin and/or insulin insensitivity (Arase
et al., 1988; Lin et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2001b; Myers, 2004;
Figlewicz et al., 2006; Davis et al., 2010a; Figlewicz and Sipols,
2010). This makes interpreting alterations in dopamine func-
tion in response to DIO difficult. For example, though reduced
D2 function has been reported with DIO, these observations
generally occur after many weeks of high fat diet, introducing
the possibility that these changes arise secondary to chronically
elevated leptin and insulin and subsequent leptin/insulin insen-
sitivity. Unfortunately, this possibility is rarely addressed and
insulin/leptin levels are not typically reported. However, in one
study that examined D2 and DAT expression after 20 days of
HF diet and reported insulin/leptin levels, the authors observed
a decrease in DAT and an increase in D2 (South and Huang,
2007; see also Huang et al., 2005), both consistent with increased
activity. In a more recent study, these same authors observe an
increase in dopamine system function when rats are switched
from chow to high energy diet (South et al., 2012). These data
suggest that the initial response to high fat and increased caloric
availability is to increase dopamine and increase expression of
the disinhibitory D2 receptor, inducing greater activity. In order
to answer the question of how the dopamine system responds
to an abundance of available calories, it is critical to disam-
biguate initial from chronic response and assess the degree to
which pathological adaptations, such as leptin insensitivity, are
present.
To what degree do the changes observed in the dopamine
system under DIO arise not from high calorie diet itself but
from a lack of exercise opportunity? That is, in observations
of diminished dopamine function associated with DIO, we can
ask not only to what extent does this reflect a pathological
adaptation, but also to what degree does a lack of opportunity
for voluntary energy expenditure contribute to this pathology?
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Evidence suggest that wheel running can alter functional char-
acteristics of the dopamine system (MacRae et al., 1987; Sabol
et al., 1990; Hattori et al., 1993, 1994; Wilson and Marsden,
1995; Liste et al., 1997; Meeusen et al., 1997; Foley and Fleshner,
2008; Greenwood et al., 2011), including increased extracellular
dopamine, increased turnover, elevated TH mRNA and changes
in D2 expression. In one recent study that differentiated between
postsynaptic D2 and autoreceptors, the autoreceptors were found
to be downregulated and the postsynaptic D2 upregulated (Foley
and Fleshner, 2008). Moreover, voluntary activity may mitigate
pathological adaptations in leptin and insulin signaling that may,
indirectly, protect dopamine function (Krawczewski Carhuatanta
et al., 2011). Thus, voluntary exercise may ameliorate the dimin-
ished dopamine function observed in DIO, though this has not
been systematically examined.
In the hypothesis proposed here, increased availability of
energy would, via up-regulation of dopamine mediated behav-
ioral activity, result in increased exploration and energy expen-
diture, allowing the animal to take advantage of a plentiful
energy supply and protect against obesity. Insofar as the DIO
paradigm does not provide an opportunity for exploration and
energy expenditure by confining rodents to small cages with lit-
tle to no novelty, stimulation or exercise opportunities, it may
reflect the consequences of thwarting energy expenditure under
conditions of energetic abundance. Many have suggested that
sedentary lifestyles characteristic of modern western cultures may
contribute to obesity as much or more than diet (Powell and
Blair, 1994; Booth et al., 2000; Hill et al., 2003; Chakravarthy
and Booth, 2004; Levin and Dunn-Meynell, 2004; Warburton
et al., 2006; Booth and Lees, 2007; Elder and Roberts, 2007;
Hawley and Holloszy, 2009; Chaput et al., 2011), making DIO
highly relevant to understanding obesity in modern societies.
However, whether the induced obesity arises from increased
caloric consumption or from a lack of meaningful opportunities
to expend energy—cage- or “cubicle”-induced obesity—remains
unclear. Equally, though widely proposed that dopamine con-
tributes to DIO by modulating reward and appetitive motivation,
its potential contribution through modulating energy expendi-
ture remains largely uninvestigated and, in the conventional DIO
paradigm, obscured.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: REFORMULATING RESEARCH
STRATEGIES
The reward hypothesis of dopamine has dominated investiga-
tion and thinking about dopamine; experiments are typically
designed within that conceptual framework. As a consequence,
the information necessary to evaluate the proposed hypothesis
is more often than not missing. Frequently, activity levels are
simply ignored. This ranges from broad, overall investigation in
which there is a profound bias toward studying appetitive behav-
ior and consumption with only recently a nascent literature on
mechanisms controlling voluntary energy expenditure to specific
experiments, such as many DIO studies in which activity is not
measured or taken into account at all [e.g., Geiger et al., 2008,
2009]. This bias toward reward theories is also reflected in the lit-
erature in which elaborate and sophisticated pathways controlling
ingestion and/or reward have been extensively mapped out while
a comparable mapping of mechanisms and pathways regulating
voluntary activity is virtually non-existent (but see Garland et al.,
2011). Integrating systematic and agreed upon measures of activ-
ity needs to become routinely integrated into studies of dopamine
function.
Second, adaptation is environment-dependent. Currently, the
vast majority of animal studies effectively investigate one energy
economy: periodic, temporary food scarcity arising from food
restriction employed to motivate animals. Not only does this fail
to reflect the range of conditions to which an animal must adapt,
but it does not reflect the primary condition believed to underlie
the rise in obesity, which is an environment of plenty, not scarcity.
A semi-naturalistic home cage approach, as illustrated by our
work as well as others (Hursh et al., 1988; Chaney and Rowland,
2008) is essential to obtaining a “complete” picture of dopamine
function. In such home cage paradigms, the environmental con-
tingencies can be controlled along different dimensions over a
sustained period without the need for artificially induced energy
deficits (i.e., food restriction) or the introduction of artificial
temporal horizons (the hour session); that is, the animal’s self-
regulated behavior in response to its environment can be more
fully investigated.
Third, virtually all work focuses on the impact of altered
dopamine on behavior with little examination of how behavioral
interactions with the environment and subsequent outcomes alter
the dopamine system itself. These types of studies are admit-
tedly challenging, as evidenced in the literature on how stress
alters dopamine function. Nonetheless, they seem critical to fully
understanding the adaptive function of dopamine. Does a sus-
tained environment of plenty or scarcity up- or down-regulate
dopamine function? Though the question may well be critical,
there is no clear or compelling answer to date and the question
is rarely asked.
CONCLUSIONS: A BROADER VIEW
Here we develop a broad hypothesis of dopamine function which
suggests that the myriad apparent functions of dopamine might
be understood collectively asmechanisms by which energy expen-
diture is adapted to the energy economy in which the animal
finds itself: a substrate for reconciling the pursuit of reward
with resources. We first elaborated this hypothesis in theoreti-
cal terms attempting to integrate different views of dopamine
function into a broader energy management framework. We
then applied this framework to re-interpreting ideas and data
in the growing field of dopamine and obesity. We propose the
novel hypothesis that dopamine, by favoring energy expenditure,
would normally be protective against obesity but that the seden-
tary lifestyles of modern society impede this protective process
and induce pathological adaptations that contribute to rather
than protect against obesity. Though beyond the scope of the
current discussion, we believe the framework sketched here in
broad strokes may be fruitfully applied to other areas of research
in dopamine, including attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder
and addiction, potentially yielding novel insights and testable
hypotheses.
Reward—the linkage of external events and stimuli to
internal needs—clearly represents a critical function from an
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evolutionary, adaptive point of view. However, reward and value
are fundamentally relative. What is the yardstick by which reward
is modulated? Here we suggest that the dopamine system, at its
root, arose to address an even more fundamental function than
reward: optimally utilizing energy resources, the very heart of
adaptive survival and, literally, a matter of life or death.
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